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I. INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Askerooth,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, 
under the Minnesota Constitution, Terry v. Ohio2 principles of 
reasonableness govern the scope and duration of a search or 
seizure for a minor traffic violation.  Accordingly, each incremental 
intrusion during a traffic stop must be individualized toward the 
person stopped, and it must be justified by: “(1) the original 
legitimate purpose of the stop; (2) independent probable cause; or 
(3) reasonableness as defined by Terry.”3  In reaching this 
conclusion, however, the supreme court departed from the 
decision reached by the United States Supreme Court in Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista,4 which held that an arrest for even a minor 
criminal offense is valid, provided the officer has probable cause.5 
Askerooth also provides another example of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court interpreting the Minnesota Constitution more 
expansively than the Federal Constitution, thereby providing 
individuals with greater protection in the area of police contacts 
with the general public.  It is the third in a trilogy of cases in which 
the Minnesota Supreme Court has specifically limited the 
permissible scope of traffic stops to the original basis for the stop, 
unless additional suspicious circumstances arise during the police 
encounter.  As recent United States Supreme Court decisions have 
tended to erode individual rights under the Fourth Amendment, 
the Askerooth decision demonstrates the Minnesota Supreme 
 
 1. 681 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 2004). 
 2. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  Terry altered the landscape of criminal law by allowing 
police to stop and briefly detain an individual for questioning on less than 
probable cause.  Recognizing “the myriad of daily situations in which police[] and 
citizens confront each other on the street,” the Supreme Court carved out an 
exception to the probable cause requirement previously necessary for a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment in order to allow police to act swiftly where police 
and public safety are at risk.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 20–21.  In balancing the public 
interest in officer safety with the constitutionally protected interests of the private 
citizen, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may temporarily seize a 
person to investigate suspected criminal wrongdoing if the officer has an objective, 
individualized articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing by that person.  Id. at 
21, 27. 
 3. See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365 (explaining the requirements of article I, 
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution in light of Terry). 
 4. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 5. Id. at 354.  See also People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 265 (Ill. 2003) 
(noting that under Terry, “traffic stops are frequently supported by ‘probable 
cause’ to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, rather than the less exacting 
standard of ‘reasonable articulable suspicion.’”). 
2
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Court’s commitment to preserving precedent while also 
safeguarding the rights of its citizens. 
This note first discusses the Minnesota Supreme Court’s use of 
the Minnesota Constitution to provide broader protections for its 
citizens in the area of Fourth Amendment search and seizure law.6  
This note then explains the rationale for the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s decision in Askerooth.7  Finally, this note discusses the 
Atwater decision and whether it was necessary for the Minnesota 
Supreme Court to decide Askerooth under the state constitution.8 
II. ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUNDS 9 
One of the unique facets of the federalist system is the 
independent authority of the states to interpret their own state 
constitutions to provide broader protections for their citizens than 
the federal government does.10  Exercising this independent 
authority, the Minnesota Supreme Court has a history of 
 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041–42 (1983) (asserting that the 
Supreme Court will not review state court judgments that rest on adequate and 
independent state grounds, provided that the state court “clearly and expressly” 
indicates that it is basing its decision on “bona fide separate, adequate, and 
independent state grounds”); see also Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional 
Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984) (generally discussing the 
reluctance of state courts to decide cases on adequate and independent state 
grounds). 
 10. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 (noting that “[i]t is fundamental that state 
courts be left free and unfettered by [the Supreme Court] in interpreting their 
state constitutions”); State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726–27 (Minn. 1985) 
(declining to construe article I, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution, the state 
double jeopardy clause, more broadly than the federal double jeopardy clause).  
In Fuller, Justice Peterson had this to say about individual rights under the state 
constitution: 
It is axiomatic that a state supreme court may interpret its own state 
constitution to offer greater protection of individual rights than does the 
federal constitution.  Indeed, as the highest court of this state, we are 
“independently responsive for safeguarding the rights of [our] citizens.”  
State courts are, and should be, the first line of defense for individual 
liberties within the federalist system.  This, of course, does not mean that 
we will or should cavalierly construe our constitution more expansively 
than the United States Supreme Court has construed the federal 
constitution.  Indeed, a decision of the United States Supreme Court 
interpreting a comparable provision of the federal constitution that, as 
here, is textually identical to a provision of our constitution, is of 
inherently persuasive, although not necessarily compelling, force. 
374 N.W.2d at 726–27. 
3
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interpreting the state constitution as affording greater protections 
than the federal government in the area of police contacts with 
individual citizens.11  Although the supreme court does not exercise 
this discretion cavalierly,12 it has done so in several cases preceding 
the Askerooth decision.  Notably in Ascher v. Commissioner of Public 
Safety,13 In re Welfare of E.D.J.,14 and State v. Fort,15 the supreme court 
concluded that article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution 
afforded greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in the 
area of search and seizure law.16  Like the Fourth Amendment, 
article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution commands that, 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated.”  Applying this mandate, the supreme court 
found a “principled basis” for interpreting the Minnesota 
Constitution to provide greater protection for Minnesota citizens 
than the United States Constitution in the areas in which citizens 
are most likely to have contact with the police—traffic stops.17 
Exploring the development of adequate and independent 
 
 11. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994).  In Scales, although 
declining to decide the issue under the state constitution, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court mandated that all custodial interrogations be recorded under its supervisory 
power to ensure the fair administration of justice.  Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592. At the 
time that Scales was decided, the Minnesota Supreme Court was the second court 
to mandate a recording requirement for custodial interrogations.  See Stephen v. 
State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).  Since that time, however, other jurisdictions 
have followed Minnesota’s lead.  See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 
516, 533–34 (Mass. 2004) (adopting a cautionary instruction whenever the police 
fail to record a defendant’s confession); State v. Barnett, 789 A.2d 629, 632 (N.H. 
2001) (using the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Scales as guidance, 
adopting a recording requirement under the court’s supervisory powers); 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-133.20 (2003); TEX. CRIM. PROC. 
CODE ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998). 
 12. See State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn. 1999); State v. Risk, 598 
N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 1999). 
 13. 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994). 
 14. 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993). 
 15. 660 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003). 
 16. See Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 187; E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 783; Fort, 660 N.W.2d 
at 416.  See also Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Minn. 2002) (discussing generally 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s history for affording greater protection under 
these circumstances). 
 17. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004) (citing State v. 
George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. 1997) (noting that “very few drivers can 
traverse any appreciable distance without violating some traffic regulation”); Roy 
Moreland, Some Trends in the Law of Arrest, 39 MINN. L. REV. 479, 489 (1955) 
(observing that “it is in traffic situations that most contacts of the public with the 
police occur”). 
4
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state grounds in these cases puts the Askerooth decision in a 
historical context and provides insight into why the court expressly 
ruled that Terry principles apply to traffic stops, regardless of 
probable cause. 
A. Roadblocks Violate the Requirement of Individualized Articulable 
Suspicion of Wrongdoing Necessary for an Investigative Stop Under the 
Minnesota Constitution 
In Ascher,18 the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to follow 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan Department 
of State Police v. Sitz,19 a case that held that a police roadblock to 
investigate drunk driving did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  
In Ascher, the Burnsville Police Department and the Minnesota 
State Patrol conducted a roadblock in a high accident area of 
Burnsville where there had also been a high number of DWIs.20  
The purpose of the roadblock was to apprehend drunk drivers.21  
Departing from Sitz, the Ascher court specifically held that the 
roadblock violated article 1, section 10 of the Minnesota 
Constitution, which requires “objective individualized articulable 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before subjecting a driver to an 
investigative stop.”22  The supreme court’s rationale for departing 
from federal precedent was that, in its opinion, Sitz represented a 
“radical departure from the way the [Terry balancing] test has been 
and should be applied” to police roadblocks and checkpoints.23  
The supreme court, like the dissent in Sitz, was not convinced that 
sobriety checkpoints were much more effective in getting drunk 
drivers off the road than the traditional standard of reasonable 
suspicion.24  Considering both the interests of the police in 
apprehending impaired drivers and “the interests of ordinary 
citizens in not having their privacy or freedom of movement 
interfered with,” the supreme court struck the balance in favor of 
protecting the traveling public from the “minimally intrusive” 
seizure of a sobriety checkpoint.25 
 
 18. 519 N.W.2d at 187 (Minn. 1994). 
 19. See 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 20. Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 184. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 187; see supra note 2 (discussing the Terry balancing test). 
 23. Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 186. 
 24. Id. at 185–86 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 461–63 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 25. Id. at 186. 
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B. Under the Minnesota Constitution, a Seizure Occurs When, Under the 
Circumstances, a Reasonable Person Would Not Feel Free to Leave 
Similarly, in In re E.D.J.,26 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
declined to follow the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
California v. Hodari.27  In Hodari, the Supreme Court changed the 
definition of when a seizure occurs from an objective standard of 
whether a reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would 
have felt free to leave, to a higher standard requiring the police to 
use physical force to restrain a person, or where the person 
physically submits to a show of police authority.28 
Although the facts of E.D.J. did not involve a traffic stop, the 
supreme court’s analysis applies to a traffic stop nonetheless 
because a traffic stop also constitutes a seizure.29  E.D.J., a juvenile, 
was standing with two adults on a street corner in an area known 
for heavy cocaine trafficking.30  When they saw a police car 
approaching, they began to walk in the opposite direction.31  The 
police ordered them to stop; while the two adults complied, E.D.J. 
kept walking, dropped something, took two more steps, and then 
stopped.32  The Minnesota Supreme Court held that E.D.J. was 
seized when the police ordered him to stop, not when he complied 
with the police directive to stop.33  In reaching this conclusion, the 
supreme court rejected the United States Supreme Court’s Hodari 
standard because it represented a “sharp departure” from the pre-
Hodari decisions in Mendenhall and Royer, which concluded that a 
person was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, 
“in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
 
 26. 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993). 
 27. 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
 28. Id. 
 29. E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 782 (citing Colorado v. Bannister, 499 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 
(1980)). 
 30. Id. at 780. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 783.  Determining that E.D.J. was seized when the police ordered 
him to stop instead of when he actually submitted to the authority of the police is 
significant.  E.D.J. abandoned the cocaine after the police ordered him to stop, 
but before he actually complied with their order.  Under the supreme court’s 
analysis, the order to stop, which was not based on any articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity, was an illegal seizure, and the abandoned cocaine was the fruit of 
that illegal seizure and must be suppressed.  See id. 
6
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leave.”34 
The supreme court’s rationale for maintaining the pre-Hodari 
standard was, essentially, that it was accustomed to applying the 
pre-Hodari Mendenhall/Royer standard, and it was not persuaded that 
the Hodari standard was a better one.35  Accordingly, the supreme 
court exercised its independent authority to interpret the state 
constitution and decided to maintain the pre-Hodari approach of 
determining, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether a 
reasonable person would have felt that he was not free to leave.36 
C. The Minnesota Constitution Imposes a Reasonableness Limitation on 
the Duration and Scope of a Terry Investigative Detention: The Wiegand, 
Fort, and Askerooth Trilogy 
The Askerooth decision provides yet another example of the 
supreme court exercising its responsibility to “independently 
safeguard for the people of Minnesota the protections embodied in 
our constitution.”37  The Wiegand, Fort, and Askerooth decisions are, 
to some degree, a reaction to Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.38  In 
Atwater, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless arrest of a person 
who has committed a minor misdemeanor offense—a seatbelt 
 
 34. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554–55 (1980); Florida v. 
Royer, 491 U.S. 491, 501 (1983). 
 35. E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 781–82.  The Mendenhall/Royer totality of the 
circumstances standard recognized that, as a practical matter, police officers, in 
the course of their duties, should be allowed to speak to citizens to seek 
cooperation without requiring any suspicion of criminal activity.  Id. (citing 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554–55).  Thus, it is not a seizure for the police to 
approach a citizen standing on a public street or in a parked car for the purpose 
of making general inquiries.  Id. at 782 (citing State v. Lande, 350 N.W.2d 355, 
357–58 (Minn. 1984); State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Minn. 1980)).  
The encounter between the police officer and private citizen becomes a seizure 
only when the police officer engages in conduct that would make the person feel 
threatened by the officer’s presence, such as the display of a weapon, physical 
touching, or the officer’s language or tone of voice.  Id. at 782 (citing Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 554–55).  The pre-Hodari standard, therefore, is workable because it 
recognizes that the touchstone of a seizure under Terry is reasonableness—
balancing the public interest and “the individual’s right to personal security free 
from arbitrary interference by law officers.”  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 
109 (1977) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). 
 36. E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 783. 
 37. 681 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Minn. 2004) (citing State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 
654, 657 (Minn. 1999)); see also O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 
1979). 
 38. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
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violation in that case—provided the officer has probable cause.39 
The Minnesota Supreme Court was troubled by Atwater’s “apparent 
removal of any consideration of a balancing of individual interests 
with governmental interests” and its “tension with a broad range” of 
precedent.40  Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly 
adopted “the principles and framework of Terry for evaluating the 
reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops even when a minor 
law has been violated” under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota 
Constitution.41 
But the Askerooth decision did not occur in a vacuum.  It is 
really an extension of two prior Minnesota Supreme Court 
decisions, which dealt with the permissible scope of a routine traffic 
stop for a minor offense.  In fact, the supreme court’s concern 
about reconciling Atwater with its interpretation of article I, section 
10 of the state constitution specifically arose from its decisions in 
Wiegand and Fort.42 
In Wiegand, the supreme court was asked to consider whether a 
dog sniffing around a motor vehicle stopped for a routine 
equipment violation was a search requiring probable cause.43  The 
facts of Wiegand involved a traffic stop for a burned-out headlight; 
although the officer planned to issue a warning for the equipment 
violation, he nonetheless retrieved his narcotics-detecting dog.44  
The officer walked the dog around the car twice, and the dog 
alerted to narcotics each time at the front, passenger-side corner of 
the car.45  The officers searched the car and found suspected 
marijuana under the hood; more marijuana and cocaine were 
found on Wiegand’s person in the search incident to arrest that 
 
 39. Id. at 353. 
 40. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 362. 
 41. Id. at 363. 
 42. Id.  See also State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2002), and State v. 
Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003). 
 43. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 127–28.  The United States Supreme Court 
recently considered a similar issue in Ill. v. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005), but 
reached a different result.  Caballes involved a traffic stop based on probable cause 
that the driver was speeding.  Id. at 836.  While the officer was writing a warning 
ticket, a narcotics-detection dog sniffed the exterior of the vehicle.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court held that the dog sniff did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because it did not extend the stop beyond the time necessary to issue the ticket; 
therefore, the dog sniff did not have to be supported by reasonable articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity.  Id. 
 44. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 128–29. 
 45. Id. at 129. 
8
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followed.46  The supreme court determined that a dog sniff around 
the exterior of a motor vehicle in a public place is not a search 
under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 10 of the 
state constitution.47 
However, the supreme court did not end its analysis there.  
Applying Terry principles of reasonableness48 to traffic stops for 
routine equipment violations, the supreme court held that an 
officer must have a “reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-
related criminal activity before law enforcement may conduct a dog 
sniff around a motor vehicle stopped for a routine equipment 
violation in an attempt to detect the presence of narcotics.”49  The 
court’s rationale for adopting this rule was that the dog sniff 
changed the scope of the stop beyond its original purpose of 
investigating an equipment violation.50  Noting that investigative 
detentions under Terry are limited in scope and duration by the 
original purpose for the stop, the supreme court concluded that 
article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution specifically 
imposes a reasonableness limitation on the duration and scope of 
an investigative detention.51  Because the stop was for a minor 
offense and the officer did not suspect any additional criminal 
activity, it was improper to conduct the dog sniff.52 
The supreme court extended the Wiegand holding to 
investigative questioning and requests for consent to search during 
a routine traffic stop in State v. Fort.53  Fort was a passenger in a car 
stopped for speeding and having a cracked windshield.54  After 
determining that neither the driver nor Fort had a valid driver’s 
license, the officers decided to tow the vehicle.55  But first, one of 
the officers asked Fort if he had any drugs or weapons and if Fort 
would mind if he searched him.56  Based on Fort’s consent, the 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 132–33. 
 48. See supra note 2 discussing the Terry balancing test.  The supreme court 
was specifically concerned about the fact that a dog sniff is intrusive to some 
degree because it detects something that is generally hidden from view.  Wiegand, 
645 N.W.2d at 134. 
 49. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 135. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 136 (citations omitted). 
 52. Id. at 137. 
 53. 660 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003). 
 54. Id. at 416. 
 55. Id. at 417. 
 56. Id. 
9
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officer pat-searched Fort and found crack cocaine in his pocket.57  
Applying the Wiegand rationale that limited the scope and duration 
of a traffic stop investigation to the justification for the stop, the 
supreme court held there was no reason for the officer to ask Fort 
for consent to search.58  The purpose of the stop was simply to 
process violations for speeding and a cracked windshield.59  
Because the officer could not articulate any reasonable suspicion to 
justify the investigative questioning and consent inquiry that 
followed the traffic stop, and that inquiry was not supported by the 
original basis for the stop, the evidence that was seized as a result of 
the illegal consent search should have been suppressed.60 
The common thread connecting these cases is that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court appears to be restoring the balance of 
reasonableness to police encounters with individual citizens, 
whereas the United States Supreme Court seems to be moving away 
from the balance of reasonableness towards the simplicity of a 
blanket rule.61  In each case, the Minnesota Supreme Court began 
its analysis with Terry’s delicate balancing of the “governmental 
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the 
constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen.”62  In 
reasserting under the state constitution that Terry principles of 
reasonableness apply to traffic stops, the supreme court is simply 
maintaining its consistency with precedent and its commitment to 
safeguarding the rights of Minnesotans.63 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 419. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347–49 (2001).  The Atwater 
majority was very concerned about keeping the arrest rules simple for the police: 
“But we have traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment 
balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case 
determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field 
be converted into an occasion for constitutional review.”  Id. at 347.  See also State 
v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 360 n.4 (Minn. 2004) (indicating a mindfulness of 
the Atwater dissent, which had criticized its majority for adopting a “bright-line rule 
instead of balancing individual and governmental interests.”) (quoting Atwater, 
352 U.S. at 361 (5-4 decision) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 534–35 (1967)).  See also Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364; Fort, 660 
N.W.2d at 418; Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 134, 136. 
 63. See State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 431–36, 190 N.W.2d 631, 633–36 (1971) 
(holding that, in a stop for a minor traffic offense, the search of the driver’s 
person for weapons or contraband is unlawful unless additional circumstances 
exist because there are typically no “fruits or instrumentalities” involved in the 
10
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Todd Jeffrey Askerooth was convicted of fifth-degree 
controlled substance crime for possession of methamphetamine64 
in Ramsey County District Court.65  The methamphetamine was 
found in a film canister in the back seat of a squad car where 
Askerooth was detained during a routine traffic stop.66  Askerooth, 
who was driving his mother’s van, was stopped shortly after 
midnight on April 21, 2001, by St. Paul Police Officer Thaddus 
Schmidt for failing to stop at a stop sign.67  Askerooth was the only 
person in the van.68  Schmidt parked behind the van and left his 
headlights on as he approached the van.69  Schmidt asked 
Askerooth for his driver’s license, but Askerooth said he did not 
have one.70  Schmidt ordered Askerooth to get out of the van, 
patted him down for weapons, ordered him to walk to the squad 
car, and confined him in the back seat where he was not free to 
leave.71  Meanwhile, two other officers arrived.72 
While Askerooth was in the back seat of the squad car, Schmidt 
asked him if he had any identification.73  Askerooth again said he 
did not have a driver’s license but provided his name, date of birth, 
and address.74  Schmidt entered the information into his computer 
and learned that Askerooth’s driver’s license was revoked.75 
Schmidt explained why he stopped Askerooth and informed 
 
commission of a minor traffic offense, nor is a person stopped for a minor traffic 
offense typically armed and dangerous).  See also State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 
890–91 (Minn. 1998). See generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 9.5(a), at 254–57 (3d ed. 1996) (the right 
to frisk may be automatic when a person is detained for certain types of offenses, 
but for minor traffic offenses, “other circumstances” must be present). 
 64. MINN. STAT. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2004). 
 65. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 357. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
11
Carlson: State v. Askerooth: Re-Applying the Terry Principle of Reasonable
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
CARLSON.DOC 4/17/2005  2:12:46 PM 
1408 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
him that he would be issuing a citation for failing to obey a stop 
sign and driving after revocation.76  Schmidt did not immediately 
issue the citations, however, and instead asked Askerooth for 
permission to search the van.77  Askerooth consented to the search, 
and Schmidt, along with the two other officers, searched the van.78  
Askerooth was confined in the back of the squad car during the van 
search, which revealed a small scale on the front passenger seat.79 
After the search, Schmidt issued the citations, advised 
Askerooth to lock the van, leave it where it was legally parked, and 
walk the three blocks to his home.80  Schmidt immediately searched 
the back of his squad car and found a black film canister under the 
back seat on the passenger side.81  Inside the film canister were two 
small bags of suspected methamphetamine.82  Askerooth was 
arrested, and later admitted, during a subsequent police interview, 
that the canister contained methamphetamine.83  Subsequent 
testing revealed 2.5 grams of methamphetamine in the film 
canister.84 
Askerooth moved to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing 
that it was found as a result of his unreasonable seizure in the 
squad car.85  Schmidt testified at the contested omnibus hearing 
that he did not observe any traffic violations other than failure to 
obey the stop sign.86  Schmidt acknowledged that he did not 
recognize Askerooth from prior incidents, and that Askerooth was 
“cooperative and did not do anything to arouse his suspicion or 
lead him to believe that Askerooth was dangerous.”87  Schmidt 
testified that it was his standard procedure to put individuals 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 357–58. 
 79. Id. at 358. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  Askerooth’s case is somewhat unique factually in that contraband is 
typically discovered during the pat-frisk that precedes the placement in the squad 
car instead of abandoned as a result of the seizure.  See State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 
429, 430–31, 190 N.W.2d 631, 632–33 (1971) (the officer justified the frisk 
because, as a matter of course, he frisks everyone he puts in his squad car); see also 
State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 888–89 (Minn. 1998) (officer gave same 
rationale for frisking Varnado before placing her in his squad car). 
 86. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 358. 
 87. Id. 
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driving without a license in the back of his squad car for his 
convenience so he did not have to go back and forth between 
vehicles when he checked the driver’s identity on his squad 
computer.88 
The district court denied Askerooth’s motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine, ruling that placing Askerooth in the back seat 
was temporary and reasonable.89  Askerooth waived his right to a 
jury trial, to preserve the search and seizure issue for appeal,90 and 
the court found him guilty of fifth-degree controlled substance 
crime.91 
Askerooth appealed the district court’s order denying his 
suppression motion, and the court of appeals issued an 
unpublished opinion affirming his conviction.92  The court of 
appeals held that placing Askerooth in the back seat of his squad 
car was reasonable because the stop occurred at 12:40 a.m., Officer 
Schmidt was alone, and it was a practical way for the officer to 
accomplish the task of verifying Askerooth’s identity and license 
status.93 
The supreme court granted Askerooth’s petition for review.  In 
his brief to the supreme court,94 Askerooth argued that it was 
improper for Officer Schmidt to place Askerooth in the back seat 
of his squad car because there were no additional suspicious or 
threatening circumstances present.  The facts relied on by the 
court of appeals—Officer Schmidt was alone and the traffic stop 
occurred late at night—were not particularized with respect to any 
suspicious activity by Askerooth.  Moreover, such facts depend on 
the fortuity of the timing of the stop, circumventing the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  Finally, 
the fact that Askerooth did not have a driver’s license in his 
possession, alone, did not warrant his seizure in the back of 
Schmidt’s squad car according to the supreme court’s decision in 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 359. 
 90. See e.g., State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. 1980) 
(establishing the right to reserve certain issues for appeal). 
 91. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 359. 
 92. Id. (citing State v. Askerooth, No. C6-02-318, 2003 WL 230673, at *2 
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2003)). 
 93. State v. Askerooth, No. C6-02-318, 2003 WL 230673, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Feb. 4, 2003). 
 94. The summary of Askerooth’s argument is taken from the author’s brief to 
the supreme court.  See Generally Brief for Appellant, State v. Askerooth 681 
N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 2004) (No. C6-02-318) (on file with clerk of court). 
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State v. Varnado.95  Because Askerooth was illegally seized in the 
back of the squad car, the canister of drugs he abandoned as a 
result of the illegal seizure should have been suppressed.96 
B. The Court’s Decision 
Askerooth did not challenge the basis for the stop—his failure 
to stop at a stop sign.  And there is no question that Askerooth was 
seized when he was ordered to sit in the back of the locked police 
squad car.  Therefore, the issue squarely before the court was 
whether Askerooth’s seizure in the squad car was reasonable.97  
Specifically, the question was “whether the actions of the police 
during the stop were reasonably related to and justified by the 
circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.”98  Relying 
on the Terry rubric of reasonableness and its prior decisions in 
Wiegand and Fort, the supreme court held that, under article I, 
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, 
each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be 
tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the 
original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent 
probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.  
Furthermore, the basis for the intrusion must be 
individualized to the person toward whom the intrusion is 
directed.99 
The court determined that confining Askerooth in the squad 
car was not justified by the original purpose of the stop or 
independent probable cause, and focused its analysis on the third 
ground: whether the governmental interest in confining Askerooth 
outweighed his constitutionally protected interests.100 
 
 95. 582 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 1998).  According to Varnado, “the inability 
of a minor traffic violator to produce a driver’s license in and of itself is not a 
reasonable basis to require the driver to sit in the back of a squad car.” Id.  
Askerooth relied on Varnado to dispose of this issue.  681 N.W.2d at 365. 
 96. See In re E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993) (if property is 
abandoned because of an unlawful act by the police, it is not admissible as 
evidence). 
 97. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 359; see also E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 783 (stating 
that after a seizure was identified, the issue became a question of whether a 
sufficient basis for the stop existed). 
 98. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 
(1968); accord State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn. 2003); State v. Wiegand, 
645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002)). 
 99. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365. 
 100. Id. 
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Officer Schmidt’s stated reason for placing Askerooth in the 
back of the squad car was for his convenience.  Because officer 
convenience did not outweigh Askerooth’s interest in being free 
from an unreasonable seizure, the supreme court concluded that 
the lack of a driver’s license was not a reasonable basis for 
confining the driver in a squad car for a minor traffic offense.101 
Next, the supreme court addressed the state’s alternative 
argument that Schmidt had authority to order Askerooth out of the 
van without having to give a reason, as authorized by Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms.102  Although it is permissible for an officer to order a driver 
to get out of a lawfully stopped vehicle without any reason under 
Mimms, the supreme court declined to extend that authority to 
allow automatic placement in the back of a police squad car.103 
The court also rejected the state’s argument that the reasons 
advanced by the court of appeals—the 12:40 a.m. stop, the lack of 
identification, and the fact that Officer Schmidt was working 
without a partner—were sufficient to justify confining Askerooth in 
the back of the squad car.104  Based on these facts, Schmidt’s 
confinement of Askerooth in the squad car was not reasonably 
related to the investigation of a stop-sign violation, necessary to 
investigate Askerooth’s identity, or related to an objectively 
reasonable threat to officer safety.105 
After concluding that it was unreasonable to confine 
Askerooth in the back of the squad car, the supreme court 
considered whether the methamphetamine Askerooth discarded 
should have been excluded on the ground that it was abandoned in 
response to an illegal police seizure.106  Although it was unclear 
when Askerooth abandoned the methamphetamine, it was clear 
that it was abandoned as a result of the illegal seizure, and the 
supreme court held that the district court erred when it denied 
Askerooth’s motion to suppress the evidence.107 
The conclusion that Askerooth was unreasonably seized when 
he was confined in the squad car was enough to resolve the issue in 
this case.  The supreme court decided, however, to address the 
question of whether Schmidt’s consent inquiry improperly 
 
 101. Id. at 366 (citing State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Minn. 1998)). 
 102. 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977). 
 103. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 367. 
 104. Id. at 368–69. 
 105. Id. at 370. 
 106. Id; see In re. E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993). 
 107. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 370. 
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expanded the scope and duration of the stop.108  Because Schmidt 
did not articulate any concern for officer safety, the supreme court 
concluded that it was unreasonable for him to even ask for 
permission to search the van.109  Moreover, the consent inquiry 
improperly prolonged the detention and expanded the scope and 
the duration of the detention beyond the original justification for 
the stop.110  Regardless of when Askerooth may have abandoned the 
methamphetamine, it was in response to an illegal seizure—both in 
terms of the original confinement in the squad car and in terms of 
the expansion of the duration and scope of the stop. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ASKEROOTH DECISION 
The supreme court could have decided Askerooth by relying on 
its decision in Varnado,111 in which the court held that “the inability 
of a minor traffic violator to produce a driver’s license in and of 
itself is not a reasonable basis to require the driver to sit in the back 
of a squad car.”112  The facts of Varnado are virtually identical to the 
facts of Askerooth.  The officers in Varnado were patrolling in a high-
crime area known for drug trafficking, violence, and weapons; they 
stopped Varnado at 9:30 p.m., and the police suspected that the 
owner of the car, Varnado’s sister, was selling drugs out of her 
apartment.113  Nonetheless, the supreme court held that the routine 
frisk that preceded placing Varnado in the rear of the officer’s 
squad car was not justified where the driver was stopped for a 
minor traffic violation—a cracked windshield—in the absence of 
additional suspicious circumstances supporting a reasonable basis 
for believing that the driver is armed and dangerous.114  The 
Askerooth court acknowledged that the facts in Varnado were more 
favorable to the state’s argument that confinement in the squad car 
was reasonable because the stop occurred in a high-crime area and 
the officers suspected the owner of the car of drug dealing.115  
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 370–71. 
 110. Id. at 371 (citing State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 417–18 (Minn. 2003); 
State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 136 (Minn. 2002)). 
 111. State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1998). 
 112. Id. at 891. 
 113. Id. at 888. 
 114. See id. at 890. 
 115. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 369 (stating “[i]n the past when presented with 
circumstances that were arguably more favorable to the state’s argument, we have 
refused to consider it to be reasonable for police officers to confine a driver in the 
16
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Although Varnado would appear to be dispositive, the Askerooth 
court went beyond an analysis of the facts and circumstances of 
Varnado to expressly hold that, under the state constitution, Terry 
principles of reasonableness apply to traffic stops, regardless of 
probable cause. 
Moreover, the supreme court could have reached the same 
result without deciding that the seizure in the squad car was 
unreasonable.  For example, the concurrence saw “no principled 
basis” to resort to the state constitution, but ultimately reached the 
same result as the majority by focusing on the improper expansion 
of the scope and duration of the traffic stop by the consent inquiry 
and van search while Askerooth remained locked in the back seat 
of the squad car.116 
The question is why did the supreme court decide to expressly 
adopt Terry principles with respect to traffic stops based on 
probable cause under the state constitution when it did not need to 
do so to reach the result it did.  The answer appears to lie in 
Atwater.117 
A. The Atwater Majority 
Atwater involved a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal 
offense—a seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine.118  
According to Texas law, if a car has safety belts, the front-seat 
passenger must wear one, and the driver must secure any small 
child riding in the front seat; violation of either provision is a 
misdemeanor punishable by a fine.119  Texas law also expressly 
authorizes the police to arrest a person violating the seatbelt law.120  
Atwater was arrested for a seatbelt violation, as well as for failing to 
have her driver’s license and insurance documents in the car.121  
Atwater subsequently sued the city for violating her rights under 
 
back seat of a squad car when the driver was stopped for a minor traffic 
violation.”) (citing Varnado, 582 N.W.2d at 890). 
 116. See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 372–76 (Anderson, Russell, J., concurring 
specially) (noting that MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01, subd. 1(1)(a) and subd. 2 place a 
“limiting proviso” on arrests for a minor misdemeanor offense and ensure that 
custodial arrests are a “reasonable and proportional response to the circumstances 
of the offense” without requiring state constitutional intervention). 
 117. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. at 323. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 324. 
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the Fourth Amendment; the issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether the Fourth Amendment limited the authority of the police 
to make a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense.122 
After exploring the nature of arrests under the common law, 
the Supreme Court rejected Atwater’s argument that the Framers 
intended to prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not 
involving a breach of the peace.123  In fact, all 50 States have statutes 
which permit warrantless misdemeanor arrests.124  The Supreme 
Court was particularly interested in keeping the rules governing 
warrantless arrests simple for police, instead of requiring the police 
to balance reasonableness when they are in the field and acting in 
the heat of the moment.125  Accordingly, the court confirmed that 
the standard of probable cause “applie[s] to all arrests, without the 
need to ‘balance’ the interests and circumstances involved in 
particular situations.”126  Thus, “[i]f an officer has probable cause to 
believe that an individual has committed even a very minor 
criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the 
Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”127  Therefore, Atwater’s 
arrest, which was based both on probable cause to believe she 
violated the seatbelt statute, and on a Texas statute authorizing the 
arrest, satisfied constitutional requirements.128 
B. The Atwater Dissent 
It is important to note that Atwater is a 5-4 decision.  Moreover, 
the dissent aptly points out that the majority’s holding that 
probable cause justifies a warrantless arrest for a minor offense 
“mints a new rule.”129  According to the dissent, “[t]his rule is not 
only unsupported by our precedent, but runs contrary to the 
 
 122. Id. at 326. 
 123. Id. at 340. 
 124. Id. at 344–45 (citing inter alia MINN. STAT. § 629.34 subd. 1(c)(1), which 
permits an arrest for a public offense committed in the officer’s presence; the rest 
of the statute deals with warrantless arrests for felony offenses).  The Supreme 
Court ignored Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.01, subdivision 1, which 
makes the issuance of a citation mandatory for misdemeanor offenses, unless 
arrest or detention is necessary to prevent bodily harm, or there is a substantial 
likelihood that the accused will not respond to the citation. 
 125. Id. at 347–54. 
 126. Id. at 354 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 361–62 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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principles that lie at the core of the Fourth Amendment.”130  The 
dissent was particularly concerned by the fact that a full custodial 
arrest could be justified by the same “quantum of evidence” that 
justified a traffic stop where the penalty for the traffic offense is 
only a fine.131  The state’s interest in taking a person into custody 
for an offense that is not punishable by imprisonment is not 
reasonable, unless other circumstances exist, such as verifying the 
identity of the offender, or if the offender is a flight risk.132 
Balancing the intrusion on individual liberty of a full custodial 
arrest against the availability of a citation when a fine-only offense 
has been committed, the dissent could not agree with the 
majority’s blanket rule that a custodial arrest was reasonable in 
every circumstance where a misdemeanor is committed in the 
officer’s presence.133  Instead, the dissent adopted the Terry 
approach of reasonableness: a citation is required when there is 
probable cause to believe that a fine-only offense has been 
committed, unless the officer can point to specific and articulable 
facts which warrant the additional intrusion of a custodial arrest.134 
The Atwater dissent also recognized that the majority’s opinion 
could have “potentially serious consequences for the everyday lives 
of Americans” because a broad range of conduct falls into the fine-
only misdemeanor category of offenses.135  Many of these offenses 
are not so much criminal as they are directed at protecting public 
health and welfare.136  The majority’s decision in Atwater would give 
officers “unfettered discretion” to arrest a driver stopped for a 
minor traffic offense, search the interior of the car, and impound 
the car “without articulating a single reason why such action is 
appropriate,” which in turn creates the potential for abuse.137  
Ultimately, a minor traffic violation could be used as an excuse for 
stopping and harassing individuals, which is a particular concern in 
the ongoing debate about racial profiling.138 
 
 130. Id. at 362. 
 131. Id. at 364. 
 132. Id. at 365.  Interestingly, these are similar to the factors MINN. R. CRIM. P. 
6.01, subd. 1(a) requires for a custodial arrest for a misdemeanor. 
 133. Id. at 365–66. 
 134. Id. at 366. 
 135. Id. at 371–72. 
 136. Id. at 371. 
 137. Id. at 372. 
 138. Id.; see also State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 436, 190 N.W.2d 631, 635 
(1971) (discussing the common and customary practice of police to frisk minor 
traffic offenders in order to “shake down almost everybody we stop if it’s a man”) 
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Considering the majority’s bright-line rule and the dissent’s 
preference for the balance of reasonableness, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s decision to depart from Atwater under the state 
constitution makes sense.  The concerns anticipated by the Atwater 
dissent create a “principled basis” for deciding Askerooth on 
adequate and independent state grounds.  If the goal is to 
safeguard the rights of Minnesotans, the Askerooth decision 
accomplishes that goal in an area where citizens are most likely to 
encounter the police—traffic stops. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Whether Atwater was a real or perceived threat to individual 
rights remains to be seen.  Nonetheless, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court was concerned.  Like Minnesota, other jurisdictions have 
held that Terry principles apply to traffic stops based on probable 
cause.139  Some jurisdictions have even done so under their state 
constitutions, as Minnesota has.140  Perhaps Askerooth is simply 
another example of the Minnesota Supreme Court taking the lead 
in the area of searches and seizures to protect the individual rights 
of its citizens where the United States Supreme Court appears to be 
eroding those rights.  If the United States Supreme Court’s trend 
continues, arguing adequate and independent state constitutional 




 139. See People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 266 (Ill. 2003) (holding that 
courts generally do not distinguish between cases in which the traffic stop is based 
on articulable suspicion and those cases in which the traffic stop is supported by 
probable cause; therefore, Terry principles apply even when the stop is based on 
probable cause);  see also United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 
2001) (en banc). 
 140. See State v. Bauer, 36 P.3d 892, 897 (Mont. 2001) (holding that under the 
Montana Constitution, it is unreasonable for an officer to arrest and detain a 
person for a non-jailable offense unless special circumstances exist); State v. 
Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175, 177–79 (Ohio 2003), reasserting that under State v. Jones, 
727 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 2000), the Ohio Constitution prohibits a custodial arrest for 
a minor misdemeanor offense; see also State v. Bayard, 71 P.3d 498, 503 (Nev. 
2003) (state constitution prohibits warrantless arrests for non-jailable offenses in 
the absence of “special circumstances”). 
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